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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION: The Procedural Requirements of
the Subsequent Injury Act, Fierro v. Stanley's Hardware

1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the New Mexico Subsequent Injury Act' is to encourage
employment of handicapped persons by equitably adjusting the employ2
er's workmen's compensation liability for injuries to a disabled employee.
The thrust of the Act is to limit the employer's liability to the amount of
disability solely attributable to a job-related injury occurring subsequent
to employment of the handicapped person or retention in employment of
4
a previously disabled employee. 3 The Subsequent Injury Fund is usually
liable for the difference between the compensation payable for the disability resulting from the combined effect of a pre-employment disability
and a subsequent job-related injury and that which would be payable for
5
the subsequent job-related (second) injury alone.
The Subsequent Injury Fund is generated from contributions made by
6
insurance companies and self-insured employers. If the Subsequent Injury
Act is applicable in a workmen's compensation case, the liability for
i. N.M.

STAT. ANN.

§§52-2-1 to -13 (1987 Repl. Pamp.).

2. [Tihe policy and intent of this legislature is declared to be as follows:
A. that every person in this state who must work for a living should have a
reasonable opportunity to maintain his independence and self-respect through selfsupport if he has been physically handicapped;
B. that a plan which will reasonably, equitably and practically operate to remove
obstacles to the employment of physically handicapped persons honorably discharged
from the armed forces of the United States or any other physically handicapped
person is of vital importance to the state, its people and this legislature; and
C. that it is the considered judgment of this legislature that the provisions embodied in the Subsequent Injury Act, which make a logical and equitable adjustment
of employer's liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act [Chapter 52, Article
I NMSA 19781, constitute a reasonable approach to the solution of the problem of
employing physically handicapped persons.

N.M.

STAT. ANN.

§ 52-2-2 (1987 Repl. Pamp.).

3. Duran v. Xerox Corp., 105 N.M. 277, 282, 731 P.2d 973, 978 (Ct. App. 1987).

4. N.M.

STAT. ANN.

§ 52-2-4 (1987 Repl. Pamp.).

5. Smith v. Trailways, Inc., 103 N.M. 741, 746, 713 P.2d 557, 562 (Ct. App. 1986).
6. Fierro v. Stanley's Hardware, 104 N.M. 50, 53, 716 P.2d 241, 244 (1986). Pursuant to
regulations prescribed by the superintendent of insurance, each employer or his insurance carrier
pays quarterly to the Fund, an amount not to exceed three percent of the compensation benefits paid
out each quarter, exclusive of medical and related benefits and attorneys fees, and a fixed amount
for death benefits paid. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-2-4(B) (1987 Repl. Pamp.). The current percentage
is three percent, Certificate of Assessment, In the Matter of Subsequent Injury Fund Assessment
Rates for Fiscal Year Beginning July 1, 1987, and Subsequent Fiscal Years (1987).
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payments for injuries is apportioned by an administrative hearing officer
or the court between the employer or its insurance carrier and the Subsequent Injury Fund.7 The Subsequent Injury Act has provided since its
inception that in order for the Act to be applicable, a handicapped employee
must execute a certificate of pre-existing permanent physical impairment
prior to any subsequent job-related injury.8 The certificate provides documentation of the nature of the impairment and the percentage of disability
as defined in the Workmen's Compensation Act. 9 The certificate is filed
with the superintendent of insurance. 0
7. Prior to 1987, -the liability for payments for injuries was judicially apportioned. N.M. STAT.
ANN. §52-2-11 (1978). The liability for payments is now administratively apportioned by the
Workmen's Compensation Division. N.M. STAT. ANN. §52-2-11 (1987 Repl. Pamp.). See also
N.M. STAT. ANN. 88 52-5-I to -19 (1987 Repl. Pamp.). A decision of a hearing officer is reviewable
by the court of appeals. Id. at § 52-5-8. For an analysis of apportionment of liability under the
Subsequent Injury Act, see Smith, 103 N.M. at 745-48, 713 P.2d at 561-64.
8. N.M. STAT. ANN. §59-10-133 (1961 Repl. Pamp.) provides:
After January I, 1962, the Subsequent Injury Act [59-10-126 to 59-10-1381 shall
be applicable only in those cases where there has been filed with the superintendent
of insurance prior to the injury or occurrence causing the subsequent disability a
certificate of existing physical impairment, or where a true copy of a certificate duly
executed prior to the date of the alleged cause of increased physical impairment is
attached to the pleading asserting liability of the fund. Such certificate shall specifically describe the existing impairment, the nature, and the extent thereof expressed
in a percentage, and shall be signed by the employee, his employer and a physician
licensed to practice in the state of New Mexico, and shall be acknowledged by
each ...
9. N.M. STAT. ANN. §52-2-5(C) and 52-2-6 (1978) were applicable when Fierrowas decided.
Section 52-2-5(C) (1978) stated in pertinent part:
In cases of persons who have begun a new employment after January I, 1962, no
judgement authorizing disbursement from said fund shall be entered unless the person
claiming permanent physical impairment has given written notice to the employer
of the nature and extent of such prior physical impairment prior to beginning his
employment by his execution of the certificate required by Section 8 of the Subsequent Injury Act ...
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-2-6 (1978) states:
A. Any worker may at any time file, and any employer may require a workman,
as a condition of employment or continued employment to file with the superintendent
of insurance, a certificate of pre-existing physical impairment.
B. Said certificate shall set forth the nature of the impairment, expressed both
as a description of the impairment, and as a percentage of disability as defined in
the Workmen's Compensation Act [52-1-1 to 52-1-69 NMSA 19781; it shall be
signed and acknowledged by the workman and a physician duly licensed to practice
medicine in the state of New Mexico. The certificate shall state whether the preexisting impairment was caused by accidental injury.
C. In the event any workman suffers compensable injury as defined by the Workmen's Compensation Act, said certificate shall have the effect of limiting the employer's liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act to that disability attributable
to the current injury.
D. In the event the certificate of preexisting physical impairment certifies that
the impairment was the result of an accidental injury, the Subsequent Injury Act
shall be applicable to any disability arising out of accident or occurrence taking
place after the date a certificate is executed.
See infra at footnote 94 for discussion of the 1987 amendment to Section 52-2-6.
10. N.M. STAT. ANN. §52-2-6(A) (1987 Repl. Pamp.).
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In Fierro v. Stanley's Hardware," the New Mexico Supreme Court
held that when an employer had actual knowledge of the employee's prior
disability, the certificate of pre-existing physical impairment could be
executed and filed after an employee incurred a second injury. 2 This note
will examine the Fierrodecision and its impact on the procedural requirements and application of the Subsequent Injury Act.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The defendant, Stanley's Hardware, hired the plaintiff, Jimmy Fierro,
as a truckdriver in 1981.13 Fierro had been legally blind in his right eye
since birth.' 4 Stanley's was not aware of the impairment when it hired
Fierro, and Fierro never told the manager he had a disability.' 5 The
manager learned indirectly "through the grapevine" that Fierro had "some
sort of problem," but the manager never inquired about the nature and
extent of the problem. 6
In 1982, Fierro was helping his foreman jumpstart a vehicle at work
when the battery exploded in his eye. '"As a result of the explosion, Fierro
was virtually blinded in his left eye.' 8 Fierro brought suit against his
employer, its insurance carrier, the New Mexico Subsequent Injury Fund
(the "Fund"), and the superintendent of insurance, who is the administrator of the Fund, claiming workmen's compensation and subsequent
injury fund benefits.' 9
The Fund appealed the judgment in favor of Fierro against the Fund.2 °
Fierro had not executed and filed a certificate of pre-existing physical
impairment until after the job-related injury. 2' The Fund raised the question of whether Stanley's had sufficient actual knowledge of Fierro's right
eye blindness to support a claim against the Fund.22
11. 104 N.M. 50, 716 P.2d 241 (1986).
12. Id. at53, 716 P.2d at244.
13. Id.at51, 716 P.2d at242.
id. The
14. Plaintiff suffered from a condition known as "Descemet's folds" or "comeal folds."
condition is caused by birth trauma and cannot be corrected by lenses. Id.
15. Fierro v. Stanley's Hardware, 104 N.M. 401, 404, 722 P.2d 652, 655 (Ct. App. 1985).
16. The manager testified at trial that he never inquired about the problem "because it in no way
impaired his efficiency as an employee." Id. When asked if Stanley's ever took steps to "get rid"
of plaintiff after learning of the problem, the manager responded, "Oh no, no, no, he was a very
adequate employee." Id.
17. Id. at 402, 722 P.2d at653.
18. Fierro, 104 N.M. at 51, 716 P.2d at 242.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 52, 716 P.2d at 243.
22. Fierro, 104 N.M. at 402, 722 P.2d at 653. The court of appeals created the "actual knowledge
rule" in Vaughn v.United Nuclear Corp., 98 N.M. 481, 650 P.2d 3 (Ct. App.), cert quashed, 98
N.M. 478, 649 P.2d 1391 (1982). Under the actual knowledge rule, the employee may execute and
file a certificate of pre-existing physical impairment after a second job-related injury to make the
Act apply to the second injury retroactively if the employer had actual knowledge of the employee's
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The New Mexico Court of Appeals held that the evidence did not
support the trial court's finding that Stanley's had prior actual knowledge
of Fierro's disability and had retained Fierro in employment in spite of
that knowledge.23 The court also reversed its prior holding24 that the
certificate could be executed and filed after the job-related injury when
the employer had actual knowledge of the employee's pre-existing disability (hereinafter the "actual knowledge rule"). Instead, the court held
that the filing of the certificate must occur before the second injury regardless of the employer's prior actual knowledge of apre-existing disability.25
The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and
reaffirmed the actual knowledge rule.26 The court also held that the trial
court was correct in finding that Stanley's had sufficient actual knowledge
of Fierro's pre-existing disability, and that the accident resulted in a
subsequent
injury compensable under the New Mexico Subsequent Injury
27
Act.
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Handicapped persons encounter employment discrimination because of
employer's fear of increased workmen's compensation liability which can
result from the combined effect of a pre-existing permanent physical
impairment28 and a job-related injury.29 For example, if an employee blind
in one eye prior to employment loses the remaining eye in a job-related
accident, there are three ways to apportion the resulting liability: (1) The
employer can assume responsibility for the entire resulting disability from
blindness in both eyes; (2) the legislature, pursuant to an apportionment
permanent pre-existing physical impairment. Id. at 487, 650 P.2d at 9. The Fund also raised the
following issues: 1)whether the Subsequent Injury Act applies only to pre-existing physical impairments arising from accidental injuries, thereby excluding congenital impairments; 2) whether (and
if so, how) the limitations of the scheduled member section of the Workmen's Compensation Act
apply to the Subsequent Injury Act; and 3) whether the trial court correctly apportioned liability
between the employer and the Fund. Fierro, 104 N.M. at 402, 722 P.2d at 653. On remand, the
court of appeals held that the Subsequent Injury Act is applicable to congenital defects; that the
limitations in the scheduled member section of the Workmen's Compensation Act do not apply to
the Subsequent Injury Act; and that the trial court correctly apportioned liability between the employer
and the Fund. Fierro 104 N.M. at 413-15, 722 P.2d at 664-66.
23. Id. at 405, 722 P.2d at 656.
24. See Vaughn supra at footnote 22.
25. Fierro, 104 N.M. at 408, 722 P.2d at 659.
26. Fierro, 104 N.M. at 53, 716 P.2d at 244.
27. Id.
28. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-2-3 (1987 Repl. Pamp.) defines permanent physical impairment as:
any permanent physical defect, due to a previous accident or disease or due to
any congenital condition, which is capable of being expressed in percentage terms
as determined by medically or scientifically demonstrable findings as 31 presented
in the American medical association's guides to the evaluation of permanent
impairment. ...
29. 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, § 59.10 (1981).
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statute, can impose liability on the employer only for the second injury
(in this case, loss of the remaining good eye) and the employee would
bear the cost of the remaining percentage of disability; or (3) compensation
for the injury can be apportioned between the employer and a subsequent
injury fund.3" The third alternative insures that the employee receives
disability benefits which would be payable under workmen's compensation for the resulting disability and relieves the employer from that
portion of the liability attributable to the combination of the prior disability
and the job-related injury.
Prior to 1959, under the New Mexico Workmen's Compensation Act, 3'
the employer assumed responsibility for the entire resulting disability
caused by a prior disability and a job-related accident.32 In 1959, The
New Mexico Legislature added an apportionment provision to the Workmen's Compensation Act.33 This apportionment provision allocated the
compensable loss between the employer and the employee.' The employer's liability was limited to the compensation payable for the single injury
incurred following employment or the retention of an employee after a
disabling injury.35 The employee bore that portion of the loss attributable
30. Id. at 10-345-346.
31. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§59-10-1 to -138 (1953).
32. See generally Workmen's Compensation in New Mexico: Pre-existing conditions and the
Subsequent Injury Act, 7 NAT. RESOURCES J. 632 (1967). The Subsequent Injury Act had not been
construed by the courts when this comment was written. See also Reynolds v. Ruidoso Racing Ass'n,
69 N.M. 248, 365 P.2d 671 (1961).
33. N.M. STAT. ANN. §59-10-37 (1959 Repl. Pamp.) states:
A. For the purpose of limiting the extent of an employer's liability to compensable disability incurred in employment, the employer may require a prospective employee as a condition of employment, or a present employee as a
condition of continued employment, to certify the existence, the nature and the
extent of any pre-existing disability.
B. Statements of pre-existing disability shall specify the degree of disability
and describe specifically the type of disability. Every statement shall contain the
signature of the employer, the prospective or present employee, and at least one
physician licensed to practice within the state, and shall be acknowledged by each
person signing the same so as to be eligible to be recorded in the county where
the employment is initiated or where the employee works.
C. Thereafter, any employee who files a certification of pre-existing disability,
and who sustains a compensable accident shall be limited in his recovery to the
percentage of disability attributable to the current injury. The burden shall be
upon the workman claiming any substantial diminution or the disappearance of
the certified disability to prove that at the time the current disability was sustained,
the prior certified disability was non-existent or to prove the degree of its diminution. In no case shall an award for current injury include liability for any portion
of that percentage of disability agreed to exist at the date of initial employment,
unless the finding is supported by substantial medical evidence that the certified
disability was non-existent or had diminished at the time of the accident to the
degree claimed.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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to the disability pre-existing employment or retention in employment.36
The employer's liability, however, was limited to the job-related injury
only if the employee had executed and filed a certificate of pre-existing
physical impairment prior to the second injury. 7 If the employer failed
to have the employee execute and file a certificate prior to the second
injury, the employer was liable for the entire resulting disability.38
The New Mexico Subsequent Injury Act was enacted in 1961. " The
Subsequent Injury Act applies when: (1) the employee has a permanent
physical impairment pre-existing employment or retention in employment; (2) the employee sustains a subsequent disability compensable
under the New Mexico Workmen's Compensation Act; (3) the subsequent
disability is permanent; and (4) the subsequent disability is materially
and substantially greater than that which would have resulted from the
subsequent injury alone. ' Generally, the Fund's contribution is the difference between the compensation which would be payable for the second
injury alone and the compensation payable for the combined injury."
Arguably, in some cases, if the prior impairment has been the subject
of a compensation award by the same employer or a prior one, the amount
of the prior award should be deducted from the current allowance. 2 For
example, a worker sustains a job-related back injury which results in a
30 percent permanent disability compensable under workmen's compensation. The worker is then hired by a different employer before being
fully compensated for the first injury, and a second back injury occurs.
If the second injury alone would result in a 25 percent disability, but the
resulting permanent disability from the two injuries combined is 90 percent, the first employer would continue to pay the first 30 percent, the
second employer would pay 25 percent for the second injury alone, and
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. E.g. Reynolds, 69 N.M. 248, 365 P.2d 671. The court allowed compensation for an injury
which would not have occurred had there not been a pre-existing bone disease. Id. at 254, 365 P.2d
at 675. The court made note of the fact that "[allthough 44 states have second injury funds as a
means of answering the dilemma presented by dissatisfaction with rules of full responsibility and
the rule of apportionment, New Mexico is one of the six that has never established such -a fund."
Id. at 257, 365 P.2d at 678.
Although the Act may not have been applicable to this case, the court failed to recognize that the
1961 Legislature had enacted the Subsequent Injury Act effective July 1, 1961. N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§59-10-126 to -138 (1961 Repl. Pamp.) Reynolds was decided in August of 1961. 69 N.M. 248,
365 P.2d 671.
39. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§59-10-126 to -138 (1961 Repl. Pamp.).
40. Ballard v. Southwest Potash Corp., 80 N.M. 10, 11-12, 450 P.2d 448, 449-50 (Ct. App.
1969). The second injury alone need not result in a permanent disability, if the second injury in
combination with the pre-existing permanent physical impairment results in a permanent disability.
Smith, 103 N.M. at 747, 713 P.2d at 563.
41. LARSON, supra at footnote 29, at §59.34(a).
42. Id. at 10-539.
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the Subsequent Injury Fund would pay the remaining 35 percent.43 In
most cases, however, the Fund is liable for the entire difference between
the percentage attributable to the second injury alone and the percentage
of the resulting disability.'
The 1961 Subsequent Injury Act applied only if the employee executed
and filed the certificate of pre-existing physical impairment with the superintendent of insurance prior to the injury causing the subsequent disability,
or if a "true copy of a certificate duly executed prior to the date of the
alleged cause of increased physical impairment" was attached to the
pleading asserting liability of the fund.45 The Legislature amended the
Workmen's Compensation Act and the Subsequent Injury Act in 1975.'
Those amendments included a repeal of the apportionment provision
added to the Workmen's Compensation Act in 1959. 47 In addition, the
provisions of the Subsequent Injury Act relating to the execution and
filing of certificates of pre-existing physical impairment were simultaneously repealed and replaced." The new section relating to certificates
of pre-existing physical impairment provided:
A. Any worker may at any timefile, and any employer may require
a workman, as a condition of employment or continued employment,
to file with the Superintendent of Insurance, a certificate of preexisting physical impairment....
D. In the event the certificate of pre-existing physical impairment
certifies that the impairment was the result of an accidental injury,
the Subsequent Injury Act [59-10-126 to 59-10-138] shall be applicable to any disability arising out of accident or occurrence taking
place after the date a certificate is executed. (emphasis added).49
This language was left unchanged when the Subsequent Injury Act was
recodified in 1978.'
43. The party seeking relief against the Fund, usually the worker, bears the burden of proof as
to entitlement to recovery from the Fund. Smith, 103 N.M. at 742-43, 713 P.2d at 558-59. The
employer bears the burden of proving apportionment between the employer and the Fund. Id.
Apportionment of liability creates difficult evidentiary problems, particularly in determination of
how much is attributable to the second injury alone. Id. at 746, 713 P.2d at 562. If there is no
compensable claim for the second injury, there is no recovery against the Fund. id. Where the second
injury is of such severity that it could have independently caused the permanent disability without
combination with the first injury, the Fund would not be liable. Id. Conversely, in the appropriate
case, the employer may be able to shift all of the liability for a compensable disability to the Fund.
Duran, 105 N.M. at 288, 731 P.2d at 978.
44. LARSON, supra at footnote 29, at § 10-539. See also Smith, 103 N.M. at 746, 713 P.2d at
562.
45. N.M. STAT. ANN. §59-10-133 (1961 Repl. Pamp.).
46. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-10-2 to -130.1 (1975 Repl. Pamp.).
47. Id. at §59-10-37.
48. Id. at § 59-10-130.1.
49. Id.
50. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§52-2-1 to -13 (1978).
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In 1982, the New Mexico Court of Appeals interpreted for the first
time the 1975 amendment to the certification requirements of the Subsequent Injury Act in Vaughn v. United Nuclear Corp." The court of
appeals created the "actual knowledge rule" when it construed Section
52-2-6(A) to allow the certificate of pre-existing physical impairment to
be executed and filed after the subsequent job-related injury if the employer
had "actual knowledge" of the employee's pre-existing disability.52 The
53 . The
court of appeals reversed Vaughn in Fierro
supreme court subsequently reversed the court of appeals in Fierroand affirmed the Vaughn
rationale for the actual knowledge rule. 54
IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
In Fierro, the New.Mexico Supreme Court characterized the Fund as
a custodian or trustee of monies contributed to it by insurance companies
and self-insured employers.55 The court stated that the Fund's main purpose is to insure implementation of the intent of the Subsequent Injury
Act to remove the obstacles to employment of the handicapped.56 The
supreme court then agreed with Vaughn that "where the employer, prior
to the subsequent injury, had actual knowledge of the employee's preexisting physical impairment, the certificate of pre-existing physical
impairment can validly be filed after the subsequent injury."57 The Fierro
opinion is void of reasoning as to why actual knowledge as a means of
complying with the Subsequent Injury Act is a more reasonable approach
to the solution of employing the handicapped than requiring the employer
to comply with the Act by having the certificate executed and preferably
filed prior to a second injury.
The Fierro decision gives rise to two problems in application of the
Subsequent Injury Act. First, by allowing a certificate that is executed
and filed after a second injury to apply retroactively to that second injury,
Fierro creates a system that is subject to arbitrary apportionment of
liability. Thus, Fierro effectively nullifies the purpose of the certificate
which is to provide documentation of the nature and extent of a preexisting disability before a second injury occurs. Second, the supreme
court failed to define the extent of actual knowledge required for compliance with the Subsequent Injury Act. Therefore, there is no judicially
defined standard for application of the actual knowledge rule. Neither the
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

98 N.M. 481, 650 P.2d 3.
Id. at 487, 650 P.2d at 9.
Fierro, 104 N.M. at 406, 722 P.2d at 657.
Fierro, 104 N.M. at 53, 716 P.2d at 244.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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interpretation of the certification requirements nor the rationale for the
actual knowledge rule adopted by the Fierro court finds support in the
Subsequent Injury Act.
A. The CertificationRequirement
The court of appeals' rationale in Vaughn for the actual knowledge rule
and the supreme court's affirmation of that rule in Fierro are directly
contrary to the statutory language of the Subsequent Injury Act. 58 The
Subsequent Injury Act contains explicit language that makes a distinction
between when the certificate of pre-existing physical impairment must be
executed and when it may be filed. 59 Section 52-2-5(C) states that new
employees must execute the certificate prior to beginning new employment in accordance with Section 52-2-6(D).' Section 52-2-6(D) requires
the certificate to be executed before the second job-related injury.61 Section
52-2-6(A) states that the certificate may be filed at any time. 62 The rule
that the certificate may be executed after the second injury when the
employer has actual knowledge of the employee's prior disability is neither expressed nor implied in any provision of the Subsequent Injury Act.
The Vaughn rationale for the actual knowledge rule is based on what
was considered by the court of appeals to be the material changes made
by the 1975 amendment to the filing requirements of the Subsequent
Injury Act. 63 The court of appeals concluded that because the amendment
made the filing provisions of the Subsequent Injury Act ambiguous, the
provisions were subject to statutory construction and interpretation.' The
deficiency in the court's analysis and interpretation of the 1975 amendment lies in the court's failure to recognize the distinction made in the
Act between the execution and filing of the certificate.
The 1975 amendment repealed Section 8 of the 1961 law relating to
certificates of pre-existing physical impairment65 and replaced it with what
is now Section 52-2-6.' The language of Section 8 limiting application
of the Subsequent Injury Act 67 was essentially rewritten in Section 5258. Eastburn, The Subsequent Injury Act: Some Thoughts on Fierro, 14 THE NEW MEXICO TRIAL
LAWYER 131, 144 (1986).

59. See supra footnote 9.
60. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-2-5(C) (1978) makes reference to "section 8", which is now Section
52-2-6(D).
61. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-2-6(D) (1978).
62. Id. at § 52-2-6(A).
63. 98 N.M. at 487, 650 P.2d at 9.
64. Id. at 485, 650 P.2d at 7.
65. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-10-133 (1961 Repl. Pamp.).
66. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-2-6 (1978).
67. The 1961 Subsequent Injury Act was limited to cases where the certificate had been executed
and filed "prior to the injury or occurrence causing the subsequent disability" or where a "true copy
of a certificate duly executed prior to the date of the alleged cause of increased physical impairment"
was attached to the pleading. Id.
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2-6. The only material change from the old Section 8 is that under Section
52-2-6(A), the employee may file the certificate at any time with the
superintendent of insurance rather than prior to the job related injury.68
The requirement that the certificate must be "duly executed" prior to the
job-related injury was rewritten under Section 52-2-6(D).69 The court of
appeals in Vaughn interpreted these changes to evince a legislative intent
to make the provisions of Section 52-2-6(A) permissive thereby allowing
the certificate to be filed even after the occurrence of a second injury.7"
The court of appeals analysis in Vaughn creating the actual knowledge
rule is convoluted and confusing. The court held that Section 52-2-6
implicitly repealed Section 52-2-5(C). 7 The court concluded that the 1975
amendment creating Section 52-2-6 failed to amend provisions in Section
52-2-5(C) which make it mandatory for a new employee to execute a
certificate prior to beginning employment in accordance with Section 8,
the predecessor to Section 52-2-6(D).7 2 The court reasoned that repeal of
the mandatory filing requirements of Section 8 and enactment of the
permissive filing provisions of Section 52-2-6(A) was a clear expression
of intent by the legislature to abrogate the mandatory and conflicting
"filing" provisions of Section 52-2-5(C). 73
The Vaughn court failed to recognize that Section 52-2-5(C) has nothing
to do with the filing of a certificate and that Sections 52-2-5(C) and 522-6(D) reinforce rather than conflict with each other. 74 Section 52-2-5
relates to the authorization of payments from the Fund. 75 Section 52-25(C) applies to persons who have begun new employment after January
1, 1962.76 It states that a judgment authorizing disbursement from the
Fund will not be entered unless that employee "has given written notice
to the employer of the nature and extent of prior physical impairment
prior to beginning his employment by his execution of the certificate
required by Section 8 of the Subsequent Injury Act. "(emphasis added).77
Section 52-2-5 was not substantively changed by the 1975 amendment.
The only change necessary in Section 52-2-5(C) to make it consistent
with Section 52-2-6 is to substitute the words "Section 52-2-6(D)" for
"Section 8".
68. N.M.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

STAT. ANN.

§56-2-6(A) (1978).

Id. at § 56-2-6(D).
Vaughn, 98 N.M. at 487, 650 P.2d at 9.
Id. at 486, 650 P.2d at 8.
Id.
Id.
Eastbum, supra at footnote 58, at 145.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-2-5(C) (1978).
Id. See supra footnote 9.
Id.
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In Vaughn, the court of appeals recognized that the purpose of the
certificate is to provide notice to an employer of any pre-existing disability
and to document the nature and extent of the disability.7" The Vaughn
court's holding, however, implies that the statutory purpose of the certificate is somehow diminished when the employer has actual knowledge
of an employee's prior disability. The court held that the provision in
Section 52-2-6(D) requiring the certificate to be executed prior to the
second injury was not intended to foreclose application of the Subsequent
Injury Act in cases where the employer had prior actual knowledge of
the employee's pre-existing disability and the certificate was executed
and filed after the second injury.79 The court simply concluded that to
require the statutory procedure when the employer had actual knowledge
of a prior disability would elevate form over substance, and thereby
frustrate the remedial purpose of the Subsequent Injury Act.8"
In Fierro, the court of appeals did not make a distinction between
execution and filing of a certificate when it reversed its previous analysis
in Vaughn of the certification requirements." The court reversed its holding in Vaughn by stating that Vaughn was "incorrect to the extent it held
the filing requirements of Section 52-2-6(A) permissive." 82 The court of
appeals concluded that although Section 52-2-6(A) states that "'any worker
may at any time file . . . a certificate of pre-existing impairment' subsections C and D leave little doubt that 'any time' must mean 'any time'
before the second injury."83
The court of appeals reasoned in Fierro that because the purpose of
the Subsequent Injury Act is to remove obstacles to employment of the
handicapped, documentation of a disability is a reasonable way to insure
that the Fund is utilized where the disability was a consideration in
employment.' The court recognized that permissive filing after the second
injury not only renders the certification provisions "meaningless", but
also undermines the certificate's purpose of insuring that the Fund is
utilized only where a disability was a factor in the initial hiring or retention
of an employee. 5 The court also noted that the Legislature would not
78. Vaughn, 98 N.M. at 487, 650 P.2d at 9.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 104 N.M. 401, 722 P.2d 652. Judge Wood, in a special concurrence recognized that the
pertinent issue in this case was when the certificate was executed as required by Section 52-2-6(D).
Id. at 411, 722 P.2d at 667.
82. Id. at 406, 722 P.2d at 657.
83. Id. at 407, 722 P.2d at 658. Section 52-2-6(A) can be read to allow filing after the second
injury if the certificate is executed before the injury pursuant to Section 52-2-6(D). Supra at footnote
9.
84. Fierro, 104 N.M. at 408, 722 P.2d at 658.
85. Id. at 407, 722 P.2d at 658.
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have included the certification requirements in the Subsequent Injury Act
if it had not intended that employers comply with them.86
The court of appeals did not address in Fierrothe impact that permissive
filing has on the management and administration of claims against the
Fund. The certificate gives the employer written notice of an employee's
pre-existing disability and provides the superintendent of insurance with
documentation of the nature and extent of the pre-existing disability. The
certificate ultimately aids the administrative hearing officer or the court
in the apportionment of liability between the employer and the Fund.
Documentation of a pre-existing disability prior to a second injury is
important to the process because it eliminates speculation about the permanence and the percentage of disability existing prior to the second jobrelated injury.
Processing claims against the Fund is relatively simple when the certificate is filed prior to the second injury because the superintendent has
a record of the percentage attributable to the pre-existing permanent physical impairment when claims are submitted. 87 Under Fierro, the superintendent of insurance must satisfy claims based on percentages of preexisting disability arbitrarily documented after the pre-existing disability
has been combined with a second job-related injury. The difficulty inherent
in proving the percentage of the prior impairment after the second injury
has been demonstrated in at least one case reported since the Fierro
decision.88 The Fierro decision has thus prejudiced the Fund by creating
a system of arbitrary apportionment of liability.
86. Id. at 408, 722 P.2d at 659.
87. Ted Knight, Director of Policy and Rates, State Corporation Commission, stated in a telephone
conversation with the author on June 10, 1987, that processing of claims when the certificate has
been executed and filed prior to the second injury is a simple task. The certificates are kept in an
index file and are on hand when claims are submitted. The problems arise when the Fund is joined
in a suit as an afterthought and the pre-existing permanent physical impairment has not been documented.
88. Duran, 105 N.M. 277, 731 P.2d 973. The worker suffered a work-related low-back injury
in 1983 precipitating a claim against Xerox, the employer, and the Fund. Id. at 278, 731 P.2d at
974. The worker had suffered two previous back injuries and surgeries prior to the 1983 injury, the
first in 1974 and the second in 1981. Id.
The worker filed his claim against Xerox in April, 1984, and amended his complaint on January
11, 1985, naming the Fund as a defendant. Id. at 279, 731 P.2d at 975. Following the filing of a
stipulation of settlement between Xerox and Duran on January 22, 1985, Xerox filed a third party
complaint against the Fund. Id. At a deposition taken in June of 1985, a physician testified that the
worker was "in the category of the failed back syndrome ... is unable to return to gainful employment . . . and has a permanent disability." Id. at 278-79, 731 P.2d at 974-75. The same physician
signed the certificate of pre-existing physical impairment on December 12, 1985. Id. at 279, 731
P.2d at 975.
A judgment was entered in favor of the worker and in favor of Xerox, apportioning liability 80
percent to the Fund and 20 percent to Xerox. Id. On appeal, the Fund asked the court of appeals

Winter 19881

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

The Fund is usually not brought into a case until late in the claims
process. 89 By executing and filing the certificate after the second injury,
insurance carriers and employers can attempt to have the hearing officer
or the court unfairly apportion a major portion of their liability to the
Fund. Attorneys defending the Fund must engage in discovery, independent of the discovery done before the Fund has been joined, to determine
the validity and legitimate extent of claims against the Fund. 9' This additional time and expense necessary to determine the validity of claims
could be substantially eliminated if employers were required to have the
certificate executed prior to a second injury.
The 1986 Legislature's handling of the certification requirements after
the court of appeals opinion in Fierroand before the supreme court Fierro
opinion suggests that the legislative intent is that the certificate must be
executed before the second injury. 9' The 1986 Legislature amended Section 52-2-6 to clarify the types of pre-existing impairments covered by
the Act which was an issue raised in Fierro.92 The language in Section
52-2-6(D) requiring execution of the certificate prior to the second injury
was left unchanged. 93 If the Legislature intended that the certificate could
be executed after a second injury when an employer had actual knowledge
of a prior disability, contrary to the court of appeals Fierro opinion, it
to make a distinction between certificates executed after, as well as filed after, the second injury
and certificates executed before, but filed after, the second injury. id. The court of appeals, however,
was bound by the Fierro decision and was not permitted to make the distinction urged by the Fund.
Id.
The Fund also argued that the claims were time-barred because Duran's amended complaint and
Xerox's third party complaint were filed more than a year after the injury. Id. The Fund contended
that a one year statute of limitations was necessary to avoid difficulties of proof. Id. at 281, 713
P.2d at 977. The court acknowledged that the Fund's policy arguments in this context "actually
raise anew the problem posed for the Fund by a certificate executed and filed after the subsequent
injury." Id. The court stated, however, that it could not solve those problems that were the prerogative
of the legislature. Id. The court did point out that the Subsequent Injury Act contains a number of
"unfortunate ambiguities" that are in need of "legislative therapy." Id.
89. Robinson, Injury Fund's Attorney Fees Prompt Bitter Debate, Alb. J. Bus. 0., April 13,
1987 at 4, col. 1.
90. Id.
91. Eastburn, supra at footnote 58, at 145.
92. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-2-6(B)(1986 Cum. Supp.) states: "The certificate shall set forth the
nature of the permanent physical impairment, expressed both as a description of the impairment and
as a percentage of the permanent physical impairment of the body as a whole .... " Section 52-26(D) states: "In the event the certificate of pre-existing permanent physical impairment certifies that
the impairment exists, the Subsequent Injury Act shall be applicable to any disability arising out of
an accident or occurrence taking place after the date a certificate is executed." See supra at footnote
9 for comparison. These changes were made in conjunction with the inclusion of congenital conditions
under the definition of "permanent physical impairment". N.M. STAT. ANN. §52-2-3(A) (1986
Cum. Supp.).
93. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-2-6(D) (1986 Cum. Supp.).
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could have made its intent explicit in the 1986 amendment. 4 The Legislature's failure to do so indicates that the supreme court Fierro decision
was incorrect.
The Subsequent Injury Act protects employers because contributions
made to the Fund allow employers to spread the risk of hiring handicapped
employees.9 5 In Fierro, the supreme court characterized the Fund as a
"custodian or trustee" of the contributions made to the Fund.' Yet, the
Fierrocourt has made management of the Fund more difficult by allowing
employers to file a certificate executed after a second injury. Employers
and insurance carriers making contributions to the Fund have the right
to expect that the Fund will be applied toward its intended purpose.97
Particularly since employers and insurance carriers are the ones who will
ultimately bear the cost as claims against the Fund increase.9" The best
way to insure that the Fund satisfies only legitimate claims is to require
employers to comply with the Act by having the certificate executed and
(preferably) filed prior to a second injury.
B. The Actual Knowledge Rule
Judicial creation of the actual knowledge rule has generated a new set
94. The 1987 Legislature has further complicated application of the Subsequent Injury Act. N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 52-2-6(E) (1987 Repl. Pamp.) was added and states:
If a worker has a pre-existing permanent physical impairment and fails to fully
and accurately disclose it to the employer in a pre-employment statement required
by the employer and as a result of the failure to disclose, no certificate of preexisting permanent physical impairment is filed, then the Subsequent Injury Act
shall apply to any disability arising out of an accident or occurrence taking place
after the date of employment of the worker.
Subsection E essentially means that the employer does not even need actual knowledge when a new
employee fails to disclose a permanent physical impairment on an employment application. Subsection E seems to deviate from the express purpose of the Act. See supra at footnote 2. An employer
cannot discriminate based upon something it does not know. Padilla v. Chavez, 105 N.M. 349, 732
P.2d 876 (Ct. App. 1987). It is doubtful that subsection E is the type of "legislative therapy" the
court of appeals had in mind in the Duran decision. See supra at footnote 88.
It is interesting to note that the court of appeals refused to extend the Vaughn rationale to the
situation described in subsection E in January, 1987. Padilla, 105 N.M. 349, 732 P.2d 876. The
employer argued that the Fund should be liable where the employer has no actual knowledge, but
where "diligent" efforts are made to ascertain the existence of a pre-existing impairment. Id. at 350,
732 P.2d at 877. The diligent efforts were questions asked on an employment application and during
an interview. Id. The court stated that "[tlo permit an employer's efforts in ascertaining knowledge
to substitute for actual knowledge when the certificate is filed after the subsequent injury would
effectively nullify the certificate requirements of Section 52-2-6 (Cum. Supp. 1986)." Id. at 351,
732 P.2d at 878. The court also noted that an employer, given false information at time of hiring,
may have a defense to a claim for compensation and thus, does not need this protection from the
Fund. Id.
95. Fierro, 104 N.M. at 406, 722 P.2d at 657.
96. Fierro, 104 N.M. at 53, 716 P.2d at 244.
97. Eastburn, supra at footnote 58, at 145.
98. McClellan, Workers' Claims Overburden State's 'Second Injury Fund' AIb. J., Oct. 4, 1987,
at C4, col. 4. Maureen Reed, general counsel for the State Corporation Commission, stated that the
state will have to increase assessments against insurance companies [and self-insured employers]
because of the unprecedented number of claims that have been made against the Fund as a result
of recent New Mexico Court of Appeals opinions. Id. at col. 1.
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of issues in the application of the Subsequent Injury Act. Precisely what
constitutes "actual knowledge" is undefined by the courts. Thus, there
is no judicially defined standard to apply in cases when the employer's
actual knowledge is an issue. Moreover, the employer's actual knowledge
of an employee's prior disability is inherently difficult to prove. The
courts may also have to determine whose knowledge will satisfy the rule.
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals in Fierro without
addressing the question of how much an employer must know about a
prior disability or how the employer must acquire such knowledge. Arguably, the nature and extent of Stanley's awareness of Fierro's "problem"
with his right eye fell short of the kind of knowledge needed to make an
informed decision as to retaining Fierro as an employee.9 However,
Fierro indicates that a casual awareness of "some sort of problem",
acquired indirectly, will suffice as "actual knowledge".'"
In the absence of an undefined standard of what constitutes sufficient
actual knowledge, application of the Subsequent Injury Act may be troublesome. The court of appeals abrogated the actual knowledge rule in
Fierroout of a concern that the rule would lead to uncertainty in applying
the Subsequent Injury Act.' 0' The court of appeals thought that the Fierro
case foreshadowed a "tedious decisional journey" for the court in its
effort to determine in each case what is or is not adequate actual knowledge.' 0 2 The court also feared that the possibility of extensive litigation
to determine the actual knowledge of the employer might in itself discourage the hiring and retention of a handicapped employee.' 3
Application of the actual knowledge rule in jurisdictions which follow
the rule'" illustrates exactly the "tedious decisional journey" which the
court of appeals foreshadowed in Fierro. The various judicial distinctions
made as to what is or is not sufficient actual knowledge can lead to
99. The reasoning underlying the "actual knowledge rule" is that the employer cannot discriminate
based on something of which he is not aware. Fierro, 104 N.M. at 405, 722 P.2d at 656. Conversely,
if the employer has knowledge of a permanent disability and hires or retains the employee in spite
of such knowledge, the employer's liability for a second injury should be limited by the Subsequent
Injury Act. Vaughn, 98 N.M. at 487, 650 P.2d at 9. See also Zyla v. A.D. Juilliard & Co., 102
N.Y.S.2d 255, 257 (N.Y. App. Div. 1951) (employer had knowledge of employee's diabetes but
did not know that the nature of the diabetes and other conditions constituted a permanent impairment.
Id. at 258. A subsequent injury resulted in amputation of a leg. Id. at 256. The court held that the
actual knowledge rule was implicit in the New York workmen's compensation law, but the fund was
not liable because there was no proof that the employer knew or retained the employee with knowledge
that the diabetes was a permanent impairment of the type to be an obstacle to employment. Id. at
257.).
100. 104 N.M. 50, 716 P.2d 241.
101. 104 N.M. at 406, 722 P.2d at 657.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Three other states have adopted the actual knowledge rule. Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§440.49(2)(f) (West 1984); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §44-567(b) (1986); New York by judicial
creation. See Zyla, 102 N.Y.S.2d. at 255.
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incongruous results. 05 Examination of the rule's application reveals how
troublesome the issues become,'" and that the rule does not always
enhance the policies of subsequent injury legislation. ,07
The special disability funds in New York and Florida are liable only
if the employer knew the pre-existing condition was permanent and likely
to be an obstacle to employment. 08 In New York, if the employer has
knowledge of a condition but has not formed an opinion as to its permanency, the New York Special Disability Fund is not liable. °9 The
rationale is that assistance from a fund established to encourage employment of the handicapped is not needed in the absence of a belief that a
permanent disability exists. 0 Kansas requires employers to prove knowledge that gave rise to a reservation in the mind of the employer in deciding
to hire or retain the employee. "' The actual knowledge rule under Fierro
does not require proof of any specific criteria other than knowledge of
"some sort of problem"." 2
The defendant in Fierro argued that "no requirement that the employer
show knowledge of the permanency of plaintiff's pre-existing condition"
could be implied from the Act. "3 The court of appeals agreed, particularly
since the actual knowledge rule was "judicially created, and does not
appear in the SIA.""' The court reasoned that something more than
knowledge of "some sort of problem" was needed for an employer to
make an informed decision about hiring or retaining an employee. "5 This
105. Compare Hines v. Tico Taco, 683 P.2d 1295 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984)(employee believed a
back injury had been cured by spinal fusion and told employer that she had not had problems since
surgery. Id. at 1296. The fund was not liable when she reinjured her back at work because neither
the employer nor employee had knowledge of the impairment.) and Ramirez v. Rockwell Intem.,
701 P.2d 366 (Kan. Ct. App. 1985)(distinguishes Hines and reaches the opposite result in similar
case.).
106. Matter of Bellucci v. Tip Top Farms, 301 N.Y.S.2d 14, 248 N.E.2d 864 (1969).
107. E.g. Johnson v. State, 727 P.2d 912 (Kan. 1986) (claimant had worked for the same employer
for 23 years and had settled a claim for a permanent disability seven years before the second injury.
Id. at 914. The fund was not liable because the employer failed to prove that the employer had a
reservation when it retained the employee. Id. at 917. See generally Larson, supra footnote 29, at
§ 59.33(b)).
108. Zyla, 102 N.Y.S.2d at 257; FLA. STAT. ANN. §440.49(2)(f) (West 1984).
109. Ciliberti v. Certified Creations, Inc., 435 N.Y.S.2d 82 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (fund not
liable because the employer was only aware of some kind of hearing problem and the employee's
hearing problem did not interfere with his work.). Cf. Special Disability Trust v. Lakeland Const.,
478 So.2d 391 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (fund liable for employer's Korsakoff's Syndrome (caused
by chronic alcohol abuse) because employer knew of employee's alcoholism. The court reasoned
that the alcoholism was a hindrance to his work and an obstacle to his employment.).
110. MacWilliams v. Conap, 392 N.Y.S.2d 506, 507 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977).
Ill. Johnson, 727 P.2d at 917.
112. 104 N.M. at51, 716 P.2d at242.
113. 104 N.M. at405, 722 P.2d at656.
114. Id.
115. Id. Stanley's argued that the permanency of the condition could be inferred since "problems
with one's sight do not spontaneously resolve themselves." Id. The court of appeals rejected this
argument and pointed out that one could have a temporary eye problem which would not be an
obstacle to employment. Id.
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reasoning, however, did not convince the supreme court." 6 The standard
for actual knowledge of a pre-existing disability as it exists under Fierro
will make it easy for employers and insurance carriers to shift their
compensation liability to the Fund.
The New Mexico Subsequent Injury Act requires that the employee's
prior disability be permanent.' 7 The certificate of pre-existing physical
impairment provides documentation of the permanency and percentage
of the prior disability' 8 and gives the employer notice of that disability.'
When the certificate is not executed until after the second injury, the
permanency and percentage of the prior disability and the employer's
actual knowledge are facts that must be proved. These questions of fact
can raise questions of credibility,'20 and the nuances which accompany
each fact situation require that a determination of actual knowledge must
be made on a case-by-case basis.' 2 ' These case-by-case determinations
would not be necessary if employers were required to have the certificate
executed and filed prior to the second injury.
The New Mexico courts will also have to-determine whose actual
knowledge will satisfy the rule. In Fierro, the manager of Stanley's who
hired Fierro was the person who learned indirectly that Fierro had "some
sort of problem".' 2 2 The knowledge of an agent who hires for another
can satisfy the employer's knowledge requirement in other jurisdictions
that follow the actual knowledge rule.' 23 Will the actual knowledge of an
officer of a corporation be imputed to a corporation when the manager
who makes decisions as to hiring has no actual knowledge?' 24 Can a
previous business owner-employer's knowledge satisfy the requirement
when the new owner-employer has no actual knowledge?' 25 Will an insurance agent or manager's knowledge fail the test because he has no authority to hire or fire?' 26 These are just some of the issues the courts will
need to address as the actual knowledge rule develops in New Mexico.
The New York courts have rigorously applied the actual knowledge
rule, making liability of the New York Special Disability Fund far from
116. Fierro, 104 N.M. at 53, 716 P.2d at 241.
117. N.M. STAT. ANN. §52-2-9 (1987 Repl. Pamp.).
118. Id. at §52-2-6(B).
119. Vaughn, 98 N.M. at 487, 650 P.2d at 9.
120. See Wall v. Premium Transport Serv., 412 N.Y.S.2d 440 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
121. See Oates v. Post & Danley Truck Lines, 594 P.2d 684 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979).
122. 104 N.M. at 404, 722 P.2d at 655.
123. Special Disability Fund v. Wheeler, 440 So.2d 460 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
124. See Grounds v. Triple J. Construction, 606 P.2d 484 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980) (corporation
president's knowledge was imputed to corporation.) and Baron v. Nobar Realty Corp., 120 N.Y.S.2d
712 (N.Y. App. Div. 1953) (corporation officer's knowledge imputed to the corporation.).
125. See Special Disability Fund v. Siesta Lago Mobile Homes, 473 So.2d 8 (Fl. Ct. App. 1985)
(former owner's knowledge not imputed to new owner.).
126. See Buckl v. News Syndicate, 316 N.Y.S.2d 574 (1970) (insurance agent's knowledge not
imputed to employer.).
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' Most jurisdictions reject the rule because actual knowledge
guaranteed. 27
is difficult to prove.' 28 Professor Larson criticizes the rule because "it
involves one of those distinctions that consume far more litigation time
and cost than the policy at stake is worth."' 29 The Fierro decision thus
places New Mexico in the minority of states that must needlessly grapple
with application of the actual knowledge rule based upon documentation
acquired after the occurrence causing the subsequent disability.
V. CONCLUSION
The Subsequent Injury Fund has the potential to play a substantial role
in the compensation of injured workers in New Mexico. The Subsequent
Injury Act allows the employer to limit its liability for a disability arising
from a second injury and thereby encourages the employment of handicapped persons. Claims against the Fund have increased dramatically in
employers and attorneys have become aware of the
recent years as more
0
Fund's existence. 13
Due to the recent changes in the Workmen's Compensation Act, an
administrative agency has assumed responsibility for the apportionment
of liability between the employer and the Fund. '' The certificate of preexisting physical impairment should serve to aid the agency with this
task. The Fierrodecision, however, has diminished the certificate's role
in the processing of claims, prejudicing the Fund's ability to administer
and defend claims against the Fund. The decision effectively preempts
the certification requirement with a requirement which will potentially
impede the efficient administration and accurate apportionment of claims
against the Subsequent Injury Fund.
Jere K. Smith

127. LARSON, supra at footnote 29, at § 59.33(e).
128. See, e.g., Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores v. Director of Worker's Compensation Programs, 542
F.2d 602 (3rd Cir. 1976) (the test for determination of whether an employer will receive the benefit
of the second-injury special fund under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 908(f)(1972), is an objective "latent-manifest" test because an employer's subjective actual knowledge is difficult to prove. Id. at 609. "Conditions that are latent rather than

manifest to a prospective employer do not qualify as § 8(f) disabilities." Id.
129. LARSON, supra at footnote 29, at § 59.33(e).
130. As late as 1982, the Fund did not have three cases a year. In 1985, The Fund had approximately 50 cases and today it has about 100. Robinson, Special Worker Fund Pays Big Portion to
Lawyers, Alb. J. Bus. 0., March 23, 1987 at I, col. I. This may explain why the 1986 Legislature
increased the quarterly contribution into the Fund from 1% to 3% of sums paid as compensation
benefits. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-2-4(B) (1986 Cum. Supp.). See also McClellan at footnote 98.
131. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§52-5-1 to -18 (1987 Repl. Pamp.).

